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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FLEISCHER STUDIOS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
A.V.E.L.A., INC. d/b/a/ ART &
VINTAGE ENTERTAINMENT LICENSING
AGENCY, ART-NOSTALGIA.COM, INC.,
and X ONE X MOVIE ARCHIVE, INC.,
and LEO VALENCIA,
Defendants.
CV 06-6229 ABC (MANx)
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court are the following Motions: Plaintiff
Fleischer Studios, Inc.’s (“Fleischer”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(docket no. 177), and Defendant A.V.E.L.A., Inc., et al.’s
(“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 175).  The
parties filed Oppositions and Replies.  The Court finds these matters
appropriate for resolution without oral argument and therefore VACATES
the hearing set for November 19, 2012.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, Local
Rule 7-15.  For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
Motion and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.  
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I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court following the Ninth Circuit’s
Opinion vacating one ruling in the Court’s June 29, 2009 Order
granting summary judgment for Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 
See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“Fleischer II”), affirming in part and vacating in part
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D.
Cal. 2009).  
Fleischer II remanded for further proceedings Plaintiff’s claim
for trademark infringement relating to the word mark “Betty Boop.” 
The Court set out a detailed factual background in its December 16,
2008 and June 29, 2009 Orders.  Thus, here, the Court provides only a
sketch of the facts, and summarizes the procedural history relevant to
the remaining claim. 
A. Factual Overview
This litigation concerns ownership of the intellectual property
in the cartoon character Betty Boop.  The following facts are
undisputed and are adopted from prior orders and the parties’
submissions.
Starting in or around 1930, Max Fleischer, then head of Fleischer
Studios, Inc. (“Original Fleischer”) developed a number of cartoon
films featuring the fictional character Betty Boop.  For a time,
Original Fleischer licensed the Betty Boop image for use in toys,
dolls, and other merchandise.  Approximately ten years after creating
her, Original Fleischer sold its rights to the Betty Boop cartoons and
to her character.  In 1946, Original Fleischer was dissolved.
Max Fleischer’s family attempted to revive the Fleischer cartoon
business in the early 1970s.  The family incorporated a new entity,
2
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Fleischer Studios, Inc. (“Fleischer”), with the same name as the first
entity and attempted to repurchase the intellectual property rights to
the Betty Boop character.  Fleischer is the Plaintiff in this action
and is a distinct legal entity from the long-defunct Original
Fleischer that first owned Betty Boop.1  Based on its view that it
owns the intellectual property (copyrights and trademarks) in the
Betty Boop character, Fleischer licenses the Betty Boop character for
use in toys, dolls, and other merchandise.
Defendants, A.V.E.L.A., Inc., et al., also license Betty Boop
merchandise such as posters, dolls, and apparel.  Defendants’
merchandise includes or incorporates elements from vintage Betty Boop
movie posters that Defendants argue were in the public domain and that
they have restored.  As relevant here, the elements derived from the
posters include images of Betty Boop, the words Betty Boop, or both.  
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ Betty Boop merchandise is
unauthorized and infringes on its rights in the character Betty Boop. 
Plaintiff therefore pled claims for copyright infringement, trademark
infringement, and several related state law claims. 
B. Procedural History
In two Orders, the Court, Judge Cooper presiding, granted summary
judgment for Defendants.  The Court found that Plaintiff held neither
1  The Court is troubled by Plaintiff’s casual conflation in its
submissions of itself and the unrelated, long-defunct Original
Fleischer that initially owned the rights in Betty Boop.  See, e.g.,
Mot. 5:23-26 (stating, “Fleischer Studios’ association with Betty Boop
began in 1930 when Max Fleischer created a cartoon charater . . .”). 
As this Court and the Ninth Circuit have noted, the present Fleischer
Studios is legally unrelated to the original 1930s Fleischer Studios. 
Evidently, Plaintiff used this sleight-of-hand in an attempt to
persuade the reader that its legal interest in Betty Boop is of longer
standing than it actually is.  The Court was not persuaded or
favorably impressed by this tactic. 
3
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a valid copyright nor a valid trademark in the Betty Boop cartoon
character.  See Order, Dec. 16, 2008 (docket no. 90); and Order, June
29, 2009 (docket no. 105), Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc.,
772 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  As to Plaintiff’s trademark
claim based on the word mark “Betty Boop”, the Court granted summary
judgment for Defendants on three grounds.  First, the Court found that
because of the word mark’s fractured history in which “rights. . .
were divided and parceled out to various entities over many decades,”
the mark could not indicate a single source, that is, it could not
achieve secondary meaning.  Fleischer Studios, 772 F. Supp. 2d at
1171.  Thus, the mark was not valid.  The Court also held that nothing
in the record showed “(b) that any of Defendants’ uses of its poster
artwork represent a use of Plaintiff’s word mark in commerce, or (c)
that any of defendants’ uses of the word mark are likely to cause
consumer confusion.”  Id. at 1170.  Plaintiff appealed.
Initially, the Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Cooper’s orders in
their entirety.  See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636
F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Fleischer I”).  However, the Ninth Circuit
based its trademark ruling on the doctrine of aesthetic functionality,
a theory that none of the parties raised at the district court and
that was not a basis for any of Judge Cooper’s rulings.  Specifically,
in Fleischer I, the Court held that Defendant’s uses of the Betty Boop
trademarks – both the image mark and word mark – were functional and
aesthetic, and were not trademark uses; therefore, Defendants’ use did
not infringe Plaintiff’s marks.  Plaintiff moved for a rehearing.  
The Ninth Circuit then withdrew Fleischer I and issued a new,
superceding opinion, Fleischer II, supra.  In Fleischer II, the Ninth
Circuit upheld judgment for Defendants on the copyright claims and on
4
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the image mark claims, but vacated the ruling on the word mark claims. 
With respect to the word mark claims, the Court made the following
rulings.  The Court held that Plaintiff had “submitted proof that it
possesses registered trademarks in the words ‘Betty Boop’”.  Fleischer
II, 654 F.3d at 967.  The Court also reversed the district court’s
ruling that the word mark’s fractured ownership history precluded
secondary meaning, finding that that was a triable issue.  Finally, as
to the remaining two bases upon which the district court granted
summary judgment for Defendants, the Ninth Circuit stated that it was
“unable to ascertain a legal basis for the district court’s”
“unexplained” conclusions that Plaintiff failed to show “‘(b) that any
of [A.V.E.L.A.’s] uses of its poster artwork represent a use of
[Fleischer]’s word mark in commerce, or (c) that any of [A.V.E.L.A.’s]
uses of the word mark are likely to cause consumer confusion.’” Id. at
968 (citing Fleischer Studios, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1170).  Because
these two bases of the word mark ruling were not explained, the Ninth
Circuit concluded “that more is necessary”, “vacate[d] the holding on
this issue[,] and remand[ed] to the district court for further
proceedings on Fleischer’s trademark infringement claims regarding the
Betty Boop word mark.”  Fleischer II, 654 F.3d at 968.  
C. Current Proceedings
The parties disagree about the scope of the remand: Defendants
contend that the sole purpose of the remand is for the court to
provide the legal reasoning behind the dismissal of Plaintiff’s word
mark claim; Plaintiff contends that, in effect, it has carte blanche
to relitigate its word mark claim and present any and all arguments
and evidence it has, regardless of whether it presented that material
5
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before or whether the district court previously rejected it.2  
The Ninth Circuit did not reverse the district court’s prior
ruling, but remanded because the record was incomplete.  However,
Fleischer II does not expressly limit the remand to providing the
missing reasoning.  Nor does Fleischer II require the Court to re-open
litigation over this claim entirely, that is, to allow the parties to
relitigate the remanded claim anew.  It therefore appears that the
Court has some discretion as to what “further proceedings” entails and
what arguments and evidence it will consider.
Clearly, the Court cannot revisit any matters ruled upon by the
Ninth Circuit.  Thus, for example, Plaintiff’s attempt in its
opposition to revive its copyright claims, see Pl.’s Opp’n 12:6-9, is
rejected because Fleischer II affirmed the dismissal of those claims. 
See Fleischer II, 654 F.3d at 965.   Similarly, the Court is bound by
the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of Plaintiff’s “proof that it possesses
registered trademarks in the words ‘Betty Boop.’” Id. at 967. 
However, the Court will not consider any arguments that Plaintiff did
not present to the district court at the prior proceedings, or that
Plaintiff did not pursue on appeal: the Court finds that such matters
are waived or abandoned.  This includes, for example, the alternative
chains of title that Plaintiff abandoned on appeal.  That the Court
must conduct “further proceedings” on Plaintiff’s trademark claim as
to the Betty Boop word mark does not allow Plaintiff to present
evidence that was previously properly excluded or to revive abandoned
2  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s exclusion of the
following evidence as untimely: evidence that Plaintiff owned a
federally-registered trademark in the image of Betty Boop, and
evidence that Fleischer’s word mark has achieved incontestible status. 
See Fleischer II, 654 F.3d at 965-967.
6
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arguments.  Fleischer II does not require the Court to reconsider any
of its prior determinations or to entertain new arguments or evidence,
and Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that it should.  
Based on the foregoing, these proceedings will be limited to a
re-examination of the Court’s “unexplained” prior rulings.  This re-
examination will be based solely on the evidence previously presented
to the district court and preserved on appeal.  This does not
necessarily limit the Court to mechanically maintaining its prior
ruling and simply providing the reasoning that was missing; the Court
could change its ruling.  If the Court changed its ruling, then it
would reach the issues of ownership, validity, and unclean hands
(among others) that the parties raised in their papers.  But, having
reviewed the arguments and evidence, the Court maintains its
conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims based on the Betty Boop word mark
fail because Defendants’ use of the mark is not a trademark use, and
because Plaintiff has not shown that likelihood of confusion is a
triable issue of fact.  As such, the Court will not reach the many
other issues the parties raised in their papers.
II.  DISCUSSION
Although difficult to ascertain from Plaintiff’s Motion,
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for (a) trademark infringement
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114, (b) false designation of origin pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) state law trademark infringement and
unfair competition, and (d) deceptive trade practices under California
Business and Professions Code § 17200.  The same analysis governs
Plaintiff’s trademark claims and tag-along state law claims.  Cleary
v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This Circuit
7
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has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair
competition and actions pursuant to [] § 17200 are ‘substantially
congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.”).
A. Legal Standards 
1. Summary Judgment
As the party asserting trademark and unfair competition claims,
Plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial and the initial burden of
production at summary judgment.  Defendants may satisfy their initial
burden with respect to Plaintiff’s claims by “by pointing out that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.
2000).  If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving
party must show that there are genuine issues of fact by pointing to
conflicting evidence in the record, or by showing that the evidence
the movant cites does not support the movant’s position.  See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).  See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986) (citing former Rule 56, which requires non-moving
party “to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.”).  
2. Trademark Law 
Trademarks function as a designation of source or origin. See 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark” to include “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof – (1) used by a person.
. . to identify and distinguish his or her goods. . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown”).  As the Trademark Trial and
Appellate Board has explained: 
8
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The salient question is whether the
designation in question, as used, will be
recognized in and of itself as an indication
of origin for this particular product.  That
is, does this component or designation create
a commercial impression separate and apart
from the other material appearing on the
label?
The Procter & Gamble Company v. Keystone Automotive Warehouse, Inc.,
191 U.S.P.Q. 468, 474 (TT&A Bd. 1976) (emphasis added); see also
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)
(“There is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is employed. . . its function is simply to designate
the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his
good will against the sale of another’s product as his; and it is not
the subject of property except in connection with an existing
business.”). 
When, as here, trademark and unfair competition claims under 15
U.S.C. § 1114 and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) are based on the same infringing
conduct, courts apply the same analysis to both claims.  E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288 n. 2 (9th Cir.1992). 
To prove a claim for trademark infringement or unfair competition, a
party must establish: (1) ownership of the trademark at issue; (2) use
by defendant, in commerce, without authorization, of the plaintiff’s
mark; and (3) that defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause
confusion.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(a).  See also Brookfield Communications,
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999)
9
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(“[Plaintiff] must establish that [Defendant] is using a mark
confusingly similar to a valid, protectable trademark of
Brookfield’s.”).
B. Defendants’ Use of the Betty Boop Word Mark is Not Infringing.
Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for trademark
infringement because their use of the words Betty Boop is not a
trademark use.  This echoes the Court’s finding in its June 2009
Summary Judgment Order that Plaintiff did not show that any of
Defendants’ artwork represented a use of Plaintiff’s word mark in
commerce.  While that order did not provide much reasoning for this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit in Fleischer I did.  Although the Ninth
Circuit withdrew Fleischer I and remanded the case, the reasoning set
forth in Fleischer I is nevertheless sound and applicable. 
1. Defendants’ Use of the Mark is Aesthetically Functional.
This analysis rests on the aesthetic functionality doctrine
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in International Order of Job’s Daughters
v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), and clarified in
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th
Cir. 2006).3  
In Job’s Daughters, the defendant jeweler produced rings and pins
that bore a fraternal organization’s trademarked insignia.  The Ninth
3  Although the parties did not raise this theory in the prior
district court proceedings, it was put in issue by Fleischer I and the
parties properly briefed and addressed it in the present papers. 
Plaintiff stridently contends that the aesthetic functionality
doctrine is not viable in this circuit.  Indeed, there appears to be
some confusion applying the doctrine, perhaps stemming from the
semantics of the phrase “aesthetic functionality”.  However, it is
clear from Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
1062 (9th Cir. 2006) that, although the doctrine has limited
application, it is nevertheless viable.
10
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Circuit examined whether that use was an actionable “trademark use” or
some other kind of use.  Because trademark law is concerned only with
identification of the maker of the product so as to avoid confusing
consumers, it “does not prevent a person from copying so-called
‘functional’ features of a product which constitute the actual benefit
that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an
assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a
product.”  Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 917.    
To determine whether a use is an “aesthetically functional” use
or a trademark use, “a court must closely examine the articles
themselves, the defendant’s merchandising practices, and any evidence
that consumers have actually inferred a connection between the
defendant’s product and the trademark owner.”  Id. at 919.  After
considering these factors, the Court concluded that although the
insignia at issue was in fact trademarked by the organization Job’s
Daughters, nothing about the jeweler’s use of the mark would have led
a “typical consumer. . . to infer[] from the insignia that the jewelry
was produced, sponsored, or endorsed by Job’s Daughters.”  Id. at 919. 
Because customers evidently purchased the insignia only for its value
as a symbol and not because they believed the organization endorsed
the jewelry, the jeweler’s use of the Job’s Daughters mark was
functional, and not a potentially infringing trademark use.
In Au-Tomotive Gold, the Court discussed the development of the
doctrine and set out a two-step test for aesthetic functionality. 
First, to ascertain “functionality,” the court must ask whether the
alleged “significant non-trademark function” of the mark “[is]
essential to the use or purpose of the article [or] affects [its] cost
or quality.”  Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1072 (citation omitted). 
11
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If so, then the feature is functional in the utilitarian sense and
cannot trigger liability for infringement.  If not, the mark is non-
functional and may trigger liability.  However, where the claim is one
for aesthetic functionality, one additional question applies: the
court should determine if “protection of the feature as a trademark
would impose a significant non-reputation-related competitive
disadvantage.”  Id.  If so, the mark is aesthetically functional and
does not trigger liability for infringement.  
While “[t]he concept of an ‘aesthetic’ function that is
non-trademark-related has enjoyed only limited application,” it is
nevertheless a viable theory.  Id. at 1073.  “In practice, aesthetic
functionality has been limited to product features that serve an
aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying
function.”  Id.  Thus, although Au-Tomotive Gold and Job’s Daughters
use somewhat different language to describe the test for aesthetic
functionality, the focus of the inquiry turns on whether the use of
the mark has a source-identifying or “reputation–related” function. 
If not, then the use may be “aesthetically functional” and is not a
trademark use. 
Consistent with Job’s Daughters, the Court has closely examined
Defendants’ products, Defendants’ merchandising practices insofar as
they are reflected in the record, and whether there is any evidence
that consumers have connected Defendants’ products with Plaintiff. 
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that Defendants’ use of the Betty
Boop word mark is not a trademark use.  As in Job’s Daughters,
Defendants use the words Betty Boop as a prominent feature on their
product, including t-shirts bearing movie poster images, dolls, and
packaging adapted from movie posters.  In this regard, the Betty Boop
12
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mark as adapted from the restored Betty Boop posters is a decorative
component: it is part and parcel of the aesthetic design of those
goods.  As for Defendants’ merchandising practices, Defendants never
designated their merchandise as “official” or otherwise indicated
sponsorship by Plaintiff; rather, Defendants’ products all identify
one of Defendants as their source.  Considering that Defendants use
the words Betty Boop as an artistic design element and identify
themselves as the source of the goods, their use of the words Betty
Boop simply cannot be viewed as source-identifying.  Indeed, Plaintiff
has not presented a single instance of a consumer who was misled about
the origin or sponsorship of Defendants’ products.
These same considerations show that Defendants’ use of the Betty
Boop word mark is aesthetically functional within the parlance of Au-
Tomotive Gold.  The Court assumes that Defendants’ use of the word
mark Betty Boop is not functional in the utilitarian sense because
Defendants’ goods would still function the same way without those
words: their t-shirts would still be wearable, and their dolls would
still be toys were they stripped of the words “Betty Boop.”  
The Court therefore turns to whether the mark is nevertheless
aesthetically functional.  Because, as noted above, Defendants’ use of
the mark is a decorative feature of their merchandise and is not
source-identifying, “protection of the feature as a trademark would
impose a significant non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage”
on Defendants.  Were Defendants to market their goods bearing the
image of Betty Boop or Betty Boop movie posters without the words
Betty Boop to identify the character, that would make their products
less marketable than the same product that included the BETTY BOOP
name.  This is because the words Betty Boop serve to name the famous
13
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character depicted on those goods and are part and parcel of the movie
posters printed on Defendants’ merchandise.  For example, Plaintiff
points to one of Defendants’ dolls that includes packaging bearing
imagery from a Betty Boop movie poster, and a product tag that is a
miniature reproduction of the movie poster.  Both uses of the poster
imagery bear the following text: “Adolph Zukor presents BETTY BOOP
with HENRY the Funniest Living American”.  See Pl.’s Mot. P. 3, Opp’n
p. 17.  Removing the words BETTY BOOP from these items would render
the textual aspect of the poster reproductions incomplete and the
remaining words would be nonsensical.  It would be obvious to the
average consumer that such merchandise would be missing something. 
Clearly, merchandise that is missing something is less marketable and
therefore at a competitive disadvantage.  In addition, because
Defendants’ use of the Betty Boop word mark is not source identifying
and simply does not trade on the “reputation” of any source, barring
Defendants from using those words would “impose a significant
non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage.”  
For the foregoing reasons, there is no triable issue of fact as
to whether Defendants’ use is a trademark use; instead, as a matter of
law, Defendants’ use of the Betty Boop mark is an aesthetically
functional use, and not a source-identifying trademark use; such uses
are not infringing.
2. Alternatively, Defendants’ Use of the Mark is Fair Use.
If Defendants’ use of the mark is not aesthetically functional,
then it is “fair use”.  The Lanham Act provides that fair use is a
defense to trademark infringement.  “Fair use” is defined as “the use,
otherwise than as a mark,. . . of a term [] which is descriptive of
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or
14
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services of [the] party.”  15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).  The fair use
defense applies when a mark is used in its primary descriptive sense
rather than its secondary trademark sense.  See Cairns v. Franklin
Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Under the common law
classic fair use defense . . . [a] junior user is always entitled to
use a descriptive term in good faith in its primary, descriptive sense
other than as a trademark.”) (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:45 (4th ed. 2001)).  “For a word or
mark to be considered descriptive it merely needs to refer to a
characteristic of the product.”  Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray
Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995).  For example,
the maker of cranberry juice could use the words “sweet-tart” in
advertising to describe the flavor of its juice over the objection of
the owner of SWEETARTS candy.  Id. at 1058 (“That SweeTARTS is an
incontestable mark for sugar candy does not make Sunmark the
gatekeeper of these words for the whole food industry.”).  The court
will address each of the three elements of fair use in turn.  
The purpose of trademarks is to designate source or origin. See
15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Thus, whether a use is “otherwise than as a mark”
depends on several factors, including “whether the term is used as a
‘symbol to attract public attention’ [and] whether the allegedly
infringing user undertook ‘precautionary measures such as labeling or
other devices designed to minimize the risk that the term will be
understood in its trademark sense.’”  Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v.
Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  Here, Defendants use the phrase Betty
Boop in connection with their products bearing the image of Betty
Boop.  It is extremely unlikely that a prospective consumer would
15
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understand those words as identifying the source of the goods rather
than merely naming the character.  Also, the words Betty Boop as used
here are not symbols at all, but they comprise the exact name of the
character.  Defendants also took the precautionary measure of
indicating themselves as the source of their goods.  Defendants have
presented no contrary evidence.  As a matter of law, Defendants use
the words Betty Boop “otherwise than as a mark.”
Similarly, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether
Defendants are using the words in their primary, descriptive sense.  
Defendants’ use has “descriptive purity” and there are no “other words
available to do the describing.”  Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.2d at 1041. 
The words “Betty Boop” used on goods bearing the image of the
character Betty Boop self-evidently describe those goods, and are not
referring to something else.  This contrasts with the descriptive
“impurity” noted in Fortune Dynamic.  There, the Ninth Circuit found
that Victoria’s Secret’s use of the word “delicious” in connection
with its flavored lip gloss was not descriptively pure because it
arguably referred not only to the goods (lip gloss), but, according to
Victoria’s Secret’s own executives, could also refer to the wearer of
the lip gloss.  Id. at 1041.  Thus, “delicious” did not refer purely
to the goods, but also perhaps to the wearer.  Here, it is hard to
imagine what else the words Betty Boop could refer to other than the
character depicted on the goods.  In addition, there are no words
other than “Betty Boop” available to describe or name the character
Betty Boop.  As noted above, these proceedings have already
established that Defendants may so use the character over Plaintiff’s
objection; Defendants must also, therefore, be able to identify this
character by name.  
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Finally, no jury could conclude that Defendants use the words
Betty Boop in bad faith.  This factor is similar to the intent factor
in the likelihood of confusion analysis: “whether defendant in
adopting its mark intended to capitalize on plaintiff’s good will.” 
Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1043.  Because Defendants are not using
the mark as a source-identifier and in fact identify themselves as the
source of the goods, they did not use the mark intending to capitalize
on Plaintiff’s good will.  
In short, when any of Defendants’ products are viewed as a whole,
it is clear that the phrase Betty Boop describes or identifies by name
the character Defendants depict on their products, that is, that this
use is “otherwise than as a mark,” descriptive, and not in bad faith. 
The Court has reviewed all of the examples of Defendants’
products presented in the briefs, and nothing about Defendants’ use of
the word mark Betty Boop can be considered source-identifying; for the
reasons set out above, those uses are, as a matter of law, either
aesthetically functional or fair use.  Whether Defendants’ use of the
word mark fits within the aesthetic functionality doctrine, or,
alternatively, is fair use, the ultimate conclusion is the same:
Defendants’ use does not indicate a source or origin of the products,
and is therefore not a trademark use.  A non-trademark use cannot be
infringing, so Plaintiff’s claims fail.
D. Plaintiff has Not Shown a Triable Fact as to Likelihood of
Confusion.
“The test for a likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably
prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to
the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.” 
Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th
17
Case 2:06-cv-06229-ABC-MAN   Document 221    Filed 11/14/12   Page 17 of 20   Page ID
 #:4895
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Cir. 1998).  Ordinarily, courts apply the eight-factor Sleekcraft test
to determine whether likelihood of confusion is a triable issue of
fact.  See AMF, Inv. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348049 (9th
Cir. 1979).  However, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach the
Sleekcraft factors here.  “A requirement of trademark use is implicit
in the requirement that there be a likelihood of confusion for
infringement to occur.”. See, e.g., MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK, supra, §
23:11.50 (emphasis added).  Indeed, the Sleekcraft test’s language
reflects the assumption that the putative infringer’s use is a
trademark use.  For example, the factors include the degree of
similarity of the marks and the defendant’s intent in using the mark. 
As discussed above, Defendants’ use of the phrase Betty Boop is not a
source-identifying – that is, trademark – use.  Because Defendants’
use of the words Betty Boop does not indicate the origin of the goods,
Defendants’ use cannot create the impression that these goods
originate with anyone in particular, and cannot therefore create a
likelihood of confusion that Defendants’ goods originate from
Plaintiff.    
The Court notes Plaintiff’s contention that the doctrine of legal
equivalents applies in this case.  This doctrine recognizes that words
and pictures that have the same meaning can be confusingly similar. 
Thus, a word mark can infringe a picture mark if the word mark evokes
the picture mark, and a picture mark can infringe a word mark where
the picture is a depiction of the word.  See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding
district court finding that consumers would likely confuse defendant’s
word mark PEGASUS with plaintiff’s picture mark of a flying horse).  
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has stated that, “It is
18
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established that where a mark comprises a representation of an animal
or individual and another mark consists of the name of that animal or
individual, such designations are to be regarded as legal equivalents
in determining likelihood of confusion under the Trademark Act.”
Squirrel Brand Co. v. Green Gables Inv. Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. 154
(T.T.A.B. 1984) (SQUIRREL and picture of squirrel held equivalent for
food products). 
Plaintiff argues that the picture mark Betty Boop is the legal
equivalent of the word mark Betty Boop, and that therefore the Court
“should find for purposes of determining a likelihood of confusion,
[that] the well-delineated image of Betty Boop is equivalent to
Fleischer Studios’ registered BETTY BOOP word marks.” Pl.’s Mot.
14:25-28.  
As the Betty Boop image mark is a representation of the Betty
Boop character, and the Betty Boop word mark is that character’s name,
it is self-evident that these marks could be considered legal
equivalents.  But Plaintiff does not show how this helps its case. 
Importantly, “the question of confusing similarity does not arise
unless the defendant’s use of the picture in question is in a
trademark manner.”  3A CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. § 21:35 (4th
Ed.).  Thus, the Second Circuit found that the word mark Babe Ruth was
not infringed by the non-trademark use of photographs of the baseball
player Babe Ruth.  See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1990).  
Plaintiff has not even argued, let alone shown, that Defendants’
use of the Betty Boop image is a trademark use such that it may be
deemed the legal equivalent of the Betty Boop word mark.  For example, 
those cases in which “the owner of a word mark received protection
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against infringing use of a picture mark, or vice versa, involved a
true picture mark, a single pictorial representation used repeatedly
as an indication of origin.”  Pirone, 894 F.2d at 582.  Here, Betty
Boop does not look the same on all of Defendants’ goods, so her image
does not appear to be a “true picture mark.”  In addition, for all of
the reasons Defendants’ use of the word mark is not source-
identifying, Defendants’ use of the image is not source-identifying,
and is not a trademark use.  Thus, Defendants’ use of the Betty Boop
image does not trigger the doctrine of legal equivalents.  
Accordingly, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law,
Defendants’ non-trademark use of the Betty Boop word mark and image
cannot give rise to any likelihood of consumer confusion over the
source of Defendants’ goods.
III.  CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court find that, as a matter of
law, Defendants are not using the words “Betty Boop” or the image of
Betty Boop as a trademark; therefore, Defendants have not infringed
Plaintiff’s Betty Boop word mark.  Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment.  Defendants are ordered to lodge a Proposed
Judgment within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 14, 2012 
_______________________________
       AUDREY B. COLLINS
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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